State of the U.S. economy by William Poole
1




because it allows us to sort through some of the
current tensions in the data that have spurred a
lot of discussion. I’ll then conclude with a few
brief remarks about the inflation outlook and how
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
can best ensure that our economy grows at its
maximum sustainable rate of growth with low
and stable inflation.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments. Kevin Kliesen provided especially valuable
assistance. However, I retain full responsibility
for any errors.
A LOOK BACK AT 2003
In many respects, 2003 was a fine year for
the U.S. economy. Compared to 2002, economic
growth was stronger and inflation slightly lower.
Moreover, corporate profits rose sharply and, in
response, the stock market rallied convincingly.
Through it all, nominal interest rates declined
modestly and the growth rate of labor productivity
rose for the third straight year, registering its
quickest pace since 1965.
If I had known these outcomes at the begin-
ning of 2003, I would have expected a fairly brisk
upswing in private-sector employment. Alas, as
we all know by now, that was not the case, as the
labor market continued to confound forecasters
and economists. Productivity growth was not just
strong but almost off the charts. As a consequence,
employment gains were minimal, as they have
I
’m delighted to once again participate in
an AAIM program. These sessions always
help me to pull together my thinking and,
I hope, to convey some useful informa-
tion to you as well.
About 14 months ago, if you’ll recall, I spoke
to AAIM on my outlook for the U.S. economy in
2003. At that time, there remained considerable
uncertainty about the likely course of the economy.
The uncertainty stemmed from several develop-
ments that had buffeted the economy over the
previous couple of years. These included the
stock market bust, the 2001 recession, the terrible
events of 9/11, the war in Afghanistan and pros-
pect of war in Iraq, rising energy prices and sev-
eral corporate governance scandals. Despite the
fact that these shocks put the economy through a
wringer, I and most of my colleagues thought
that the nation’s economy was in the process of
transitioning from a period of recession and slow
growth to a period of solid and sustained eco-
nomic growth. The economy enjoyed a firm foun-
dation built upon low and stable inflation and
strong productivity growth.
In fact, the economy did enjoy healthy growth
last year. The real surprise was unusually high
productivity growth and disappointingly slow
employment growth. We should never complain
about robust productivity growth; we can and
should complain that output growth was not rapid
enough, given the productivity growth, to yield
robust job growth.
In my remarks today, I will review some of
last year’s key developments. I’ll then turn to a
framework that I find helpful in thinking about
the outlook. This framework, known as growth
accounting, is especially helpful at this juncturebeen since the trough of the recession in November
2001. Whether measured by the number of jobs,
as reported in the establishment survey, or by
the number of people working, as reported in the
household survey, employment did not keep pace
with estimated population growth. I’ll talk a bit
more about this development later. For now, let
me turn to some of the key developments that
occurred last year, and whether they might simi-
larly affect economic activity this year.
About this time last year, the consensus of
private-sector forecasters, and of the Presidents
and Governors of the FOMC, was that real GDP
would increase by a bit more than 3¼ percent from
the fourth quarter of 2002 to the fourth quarter of
2003, after increasing about 2¾ percent in 2002.1
Given the fairly sharp downturn in real business
fixed investment between the fourth quarter of
2000andthefourthquarterof2002(12.75percent),
many economists believed that a key element
underpinning the forecast for 2003 was an upturn
in business capital spending. While adverse
shocks had restrained the pace of business pur-
chases of capital goods since late 2000, forecasters
agreed that the economy would continue to under-
perform unless firms were willing to commit
scarce resources to replacing or upgrading their
plant and equipment.
In the first quarter of 2003, real business fixed
investment continued to decline. In hindsight, it
appeared that some industries were still working
through excesses that had built up over the prior
few years. Investment spending was also con-
strained by an abundance of business caution.
Although consumer expenditures over the first
half of 2003 were increasing modestly faster than
they were over the last half of 2002, households
were also exhibiting an unusual degree of caution
over the first half of the year. With expenditures
by consumers and businesses relatively weak,
real GDP growth remained disappointing, turn-
ing in gains of 2.0 and 3.1 percent at an annual
rate in the first and second quarters of 2003,
respectively.
Beginning around mid-year, economic con-
ditions started to improve. As many had hoped
and expected, the pace of business fixed invest-
ment began to pick up noticeably, as did the pace
of consumer spending. For the year, real expen-
ditures on equipment and software rose nearly 9
percent, which was about what the Blue Chip
Consensus had expected. However, contrary to
expectations, business outlays for structures fell
for the third consecutive year. Also helping to
boost economic growth was a sharp upturn in
exports of goods and services. In all, with the
pace of output growth rising to more than a 6
percent rate over the last half of the year, real
GDP is estimated to have increased 4.3 percent
over the four quarters of 2003, noticeably faster
than had been expected at the beginning of the
year. Even more impressive, this gain was all in
final sales, as inventory investment declined
modestly.
The roughly 1 percentage-point difference
between what the consensus of the FOMC and
private-sector forecasters expected for 2003 and
what actually happened can be traced, in large
part, to a few key developments. First, real con-
sumer expenditures on durable goods were much
stronger than expected. In particular, helped by
generous incentives, sales of new cars and light
trucks stayed above 16 million units for the fifth
straight year. Second, to the surprise of many,
the housing industry continued to power ahead.
According to the Blue Chip Consensus at the end
of 2002, growth of real residential fixed invest-
ment was expected to decelerate from about 7
percent in 2002 to around 2 percent in 2003.
Instead, real housing expenditures increased by
a bit more than 10 percent, as new home sales
reached a record high for the third straight year.
Finally, the economy received a boost from larger-
than-expected increases in real federal defense
expenditures.
While it is possible that future data revisions
will change the pattern of economic growth in
2003, what matters for our purposes today is why
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1 Private-sector forecasts for 2003 are taken from the December 2002 Blue Chip Econometric Detail. The FOMC projections for 2003 were pub-
lished in the Monetary Report to the Congress, which was released on February 11, 2003.last year’s forecast went astray. However, I do
want to emphasize that the size of the forecast
error was well within normal bounds. Although
identifying the size of the consensus forecast
error is straightforward, pinning down the exact
reason why the forecast went off track is not so
easy. Nor is it easy to determine whether the
forces that produced these errors can be expected
to have similar influences this year.
Clearly, the most significant unexpected
development in 2003 was the continued strong
growth of labor productivity. The Blue Chip
Consensus projected that the annualized growth
of output per hour in the nonfarm business sector
would average 2 percent over the four quarters
of 2003. Instead, labor productivity growth aver-
aged 5¼ percent, a large forecast error. Faster
growth of labor productivity not only kept real
after-tax income growth at elevated rates, which
boosted consumer expenditures, but it helped to
keep aggregate price pressures at bay. As core
inflation rates drifted lower in 2003 compared
with 2002, nominal interest rates did as well.
Besides the obvious benefits to the housing sector,
and to the producers of big-ticket items like motor
vehicles and appliances, households and busi-
nesses also benefited from lower interest rates by
refinancing outstanding debt.
But perhaps the most important influence of
strong productivity growth on the economy over
the past couple of years has been on the domestic
labor market. Let me now turn to the second part
of my talk to discuss this important issue.
A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING
ABOUT THE OUTLOOK
When people ask me about my outlook for
the economy, I emphasize that my views are
largely informed by looking at a consensus of
several forecasts. As an informed consumer,
however, I do not buy the product uncritically.
Besides examining the usual forecast detail con-
cerning expectations for major components of GDP,
I often find it useful to employ a simple growth
accounting framework, which emphasizes the
supply side of the economy. In its condensed
form, this framework relates the growth of labor
input to the growth of real GDP. Labor input is
analyzed by starting with growth in the working
age civilian population. Then, we calculate the
percentage of the working age population that is
employed. Finally, we examine the hours each
worker puts in. The relationship between the out-
put variable and the labor hours input variable is
the growth of labor productivity—output per hour
in the nonfarm business sector. Each year, the
Economic Report of the President publishes such
a table.
This simple framework is especially useful
when analyzing economic conditions today, since
it reminds us that economic growth ultimately is
a function of employment (or aggregate hours
worked) and how productive those workers are.
From the fourth quarter of 2002 to fourth quarter
of 2003, total hours worked—which is simply the
number of jobs times the average number of hours
worked at each job—declined 0.9 percent. This
was the third consecutive yearly decline in hours
worked, something not seen since 1980-82. How-
ever, since real GDP continued to increase, it
follows that economic growth over this period
resulted from ever faster increases in labor pro-
ductivity growth.
As an aside, one of the conundrums in the
data of late has been the divergence between the
two primary measures of employment, as reported
on the first Friday of each month by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Briefly, one survey—the
household survey—counts the number of people
employed. The other survey—the establishment
survey—counts the number of jobs. The two sur-
veys do not come up with the same count for
several reasons. One, for example, is that some
people hold more than one job for pay, and there-
fore appear more than once in the establishment
survey but only once in the household survey.
Over time, however, the two measures tend to
track each other fairly closely.
But since November 2001, establishment
employment has declined a little more than
0.75 percent, while household employment has
increased a little more than 1.5 percent. While
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tions than answers, both surveys nevertheless
show that the labor market remains unusually
weak at this stage of the business cycle compared
with the norm.
Most economists view the payroll estimate
as the more reliable of the two employment meas-
ures. Still, until we see future data revisions or
satisfactory explanations of the divergence of the
two employment measures that resolve the
unusual discrepancy, it is appropriate to withhold
firm judgments on some issues, especially those
related to likely future productivity growth trends.
In any event, it is hard to escape the conclu-
sion that in 2003 firms in the aggregate were still
unwilling to compete aggressively in the labor
market because they continued to reap impressive
productivity gains from their existing stocks of
labor and capital. What we do not know is whether
firms had excess labor which is now becoming
more fully utilized or whether underlying produc-
tivity growth is now higher. For example, if Firm
XYZ had underutilized workers it might be able to
produce 20 widgets per worker hour quite easily
whereas it had been producing 15 per hour. How-
ever, if demand rises further it might not be easy to
produce 25 widgets per hour, and the firm would
have to add workers to meet higher demand. On
the other hand, if structural productivity growth
is now on a new higher growth track, then higher
demand might be met with the same number of
workers producing ever more widgets per hour.
Data showing that output per hour rose last year
from 15 to 20 widgets just does not distinguish
between these two explanations.
In the aggregate, then, it’s not that productivity
growth is too high; the issue is simply that real
GDP growth is not strong enough to generate new
jobs given that productivity growth. As a matter
of arithmetic, unless we see real GDP growth in
excess of labor productivity growth on a sustained
basis, we won’t see much job creation.
OUTLOOK FOR 2004
I do not remember a time in my professional
life when uncertainty about productivity growth
played such a large role in uncertainty about
employment growth. Usually, uncertainty about
employment growth is a consequence of uncer-
tainty about GDP growth. Certainly, we are faced
with the usual uncertainty about GDP growth but
now the productivity puzzles makes an employ-
ment forecast more than typically hazardous.
Based on past experience, it seems highly
improbable that labor productivity growth can
continue to outstrip the growth of real GDP indefi-
nitely, particularly when population growth
remains around 1 percent. To believe otherwise
implies further declines in the employment-to-
population ratio. That would involve a growing
labor market disequilibrium, whereas normal
economic forces tend to reduce such a disequi-
librium over time. If productivity growth remains
extremely high, it seems likely that rising busi-
ness profits and declining unit labor costs will
be spurs to new hiring. Output growth would
then rise sufficiently above productivity growth
to be consistent with satisfactory employment
growth. If productivity growth is less rapid than
last year, then that outcome would also point to
higher employment growth.
This analysis leads me to expect higher
employment growth in 2004, which would lead
to a rising ratio of employment to population—a
normal characteristic of the economy when real
GDP is growing at a healthy clip. It is also reason-
able to expect to see hours worked begin to rise,
both because employment rises and because
average hours worked per week rises. Judging
from the last two business expansions, hours
growth of somewhere between 1 and 2 percent
seems reasonable. Although projecting produc-
tivity growth is obviously hazardous, a projection
of around 3 percent seems plausible to me. The
hours and productivity projections add up to
real GDP growth of between 4 and 5 percent in
2004. I think these projections are sensible best
guesses, but I also believe that there is no reason
to rule out the possibility of a considerably higher
outcome. The normal forecasting uncertainty
suggests that we need to consider an error band
of roughly plus or minus 1½ percent for the GDP
forecast over the next four quarters.
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increases in employment. The Blue Chip
Consensus expects monthly nonfarm payroll
employment gains to average a little less than
170,000 in 2004. Similarly, the recent Outlook
survey by the National Association for Business
Economics projects that monthly job gains will
average 150,000 per month in 2004. These pro-
jected rates of job creation are well below those
seen during the 1980s business expansion, when
payroll employment increases averaged about
230,000 per month, and during the 1990s expan-
sion, when payroll employment increases aver-
aged roughly 200,000 per month. Nevertheless,
the consensus employment projections for 2004
seem consistent with a world of both higher pro-
ductivity growth and slightly lower population
growth compared to the previous two expansions.
Since employment gains of roughly 125,000
per month are necessary to keep up with the 1
percent annual rate of growth in the labor force,
the projected employment growth in excess of
that means that we should expect some decline
in the unemployment rate by the end of the year
from its current 5.6 percent rate.
THE OUTLOOK FOR INFLATION
Besides the rebound in structural labor pro-
ductivity growth observed since 1995, probably
the most important domestic economic develop-
ment over the last quarter century has been the
achievement of price stability—or, at least, some-
thing pretty close to it. Today’s low and relatively
stable rate of inflation is far removed from the
inflation experience from the late 1960s to the
early 1980s—a period referred to in the economic
text-books as The Great Inflation. Memories of
the Great Inflation are fading; many fail to appre-
ciate how important this development is.
In any walk of life, sustained high perform-
ance adds to the credibility of those responsible
for the outcome. Most people understand that the
Federal Reserve has the primary responsibility
to achieve the goal of price stability, and as a con-
sequence of sustained excellent results on that
front the Fed’s credibility with the markets and
with the public is high. That credibility is impor-
tant for a number of reasons. One of the most
important is that the Federal Reserve, in setting
its interest rate target during times of uncertainty,
does not have to worry that markets will quickly
come to expect higher inflation. The markets
understand the Fed’s commitment and are patient
with us. That, in my view, is the underlying rea-
son why the FOMC, in its policy statement at the
conclusion of its last meeting could say, “the
Committee believes that it can be patient in
removing its policy accommodation.”
When viewed through this lens, maintaining
existing core rates of inflation around their current
levels makes a lot of sense. From December 2002
to December 2003, the chain-type price index for
personal consumption expenditures—the PCE
price index—increased by a little less than 1.5
percent, while the core PCE price index rose by a
little less than 1 percent. Keeping inflation low
and stable depends importantly, though certainly
not entirely, on keeping inflation expectations in
check. If financial markets, consumers, and pro-
ducers view this outcome as consistent with the
Fed’s long-run goals, then I see no reason why we
should not see a similarly benign inflation out-
come this year; however, I would expect to see
the gap between the total and core measures nar-
row, since over time they tend to be numerically
close to each other.
Managing inflation expectations requires
appropriate responses to economic fundamentals.
Unexpected developments have the potential to
alter the FOMC’s assessment of the appropriate
stance of monetary policy. Clearly, unexpected
developments can’t be anticipated; if they could,
our forecast errors would converge to zero and
the FOMC would only have to meet once a year
or so.
Many observers have noted that the current
federal funds target rate of 1 percent cannot
remain in force indefinitely. That knowledge is
built into the term structure of interest rates. The
5-year Treasury rate, for example, is higher than
the 1-year rate because the market expects rates
to rise over time. It is not possible to predict the
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target, but we are fortunate that the market under-
stands the issue so well. I am sure that there will
be bold headlines, probably on the front pages of
newspapers, when the FOMC announces the first
rate increase. Such a headline will be misleading
in one sense, rather like a headline reporting that
an airline flight arrived ten minutes early or ten
minutes late. Headlines should really be reserved
for unexpected developments, like plane crashes.
Fortunately, there is absolutely no reason to antici-
pate monetary policy headlines of that sort!
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I’ve outlined a scenario for 2004 that appears
quite promising: Continued strong real GDP
growth—perhaps even stronger than last year’s
robust growth; a core inflation rate remaining
around 1 percent, or perhaps a little higher; and,
finally, sustained increases in payroll employment
that are substantially stronger than those seen
over the past five months, which saw an average
of about 75,000 per month. If this outlook comes
to pass, I’m sure that a year from now we will all
agree that 2004 was a banner year.
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